This article investigates a fund manager's risk-taking incentives induced by an increasing and convex relationship of fund flows to relative performance. In a dynamic portfolio choice framework, we show that the ensuing convexities in the manager's objective give rise to a finite risk-shifting range over which she gambles to finish ahead of her benchmark. Such gambling entails either an increase or a decrease in the volatility of the manager's portfolio, depending on her risk tolerance. In the latter case, the manager reduces her holdings of the risky asset despite its positive risk premium. Our empirical analysis lends support to the novel predictions of the model. (JEL G11, G20, D60, D81)
the fund if it performs well relative to a benchmark. With her compensation typically linked to the value of assets under management, this positive fundflows to relative-performance relationship creates an implicit incentive for the manager to distort her asset allocation choice so as to increase the likelihood of future fund inflows. Our objective is to analyze the effects of these incentives within a familiar dynamic portfolio choice framework.
We consider a risk-averse fund manager whose compensation depends on the fund's value at some terminal date (e.g., end of the year). This fund value is determined by the portfolio choice of the manager during the year and by capital inflows/outflows at year end. The fund flows depend on the fund's performance over the year relative to a benchmark-a reference portfolio of stock and money markets. We consider several types of the flow-performance relationship, which all give rise to local convexities in the manager's objective. 2 While the importance of such local convexities has been noted by numerous studies, our analysis uncovers several novel implications of these convexities which are at odds with conventional views.
Absent implicit incentives, the manager in our setting maintains a constant risk exposure, independent of her performance relative to the benchmark (Merton (1971) ). But when she accounts for the flow-performance relationship, she takes on additional risk over a certain range of relative performance, the ''risk-shifting'' range. We show that implicit incentives can lead the manager either to increase or decrease volatility over this range. The volatility increase corresponds to the common wisdom [Jensen and Meckling (1976) ]. The possibility of a decrease is somewhat unexpected: how can ''gambling'' to finish ahead of the benchmark be consistent with a decrease in portfolio volatility? Simply, in the context of relative performance evaluation, any strategy entailing a deviation from the benchmark is inherently risky. By taking on more systematic risk than that of the benchmark (boosting portfolio volatility), the manager gambles to improve her relative standing when the benchmark goes up. Similarly, by taking on less systematic risk than that of the benchmark (reducing volatility), the manager bets on improving her relative performance when the benchmark falls. The direction of the manager's deviation from the benchmark depends on her risk aversion: a more risk-tolerant manager boosts volatility, while a relatively risk-averse manager does the opposite, despite the positive risk premium offered by the risky asset.
Since the manager is risk averse, the range over which she takes excessive risk, as well as her ensuing risk exposure, are finite. No risk shifting takes place when the manager is far behind or ahead of the benchmark. Overall, the strength of managerial risk-taking incentives is highly time-and state-dependent, with a maximum positioned somewhere deep in the underperformance region and a minimum differing across the specifications of the flow-performance relationship we consider. These implications are typically in disagreement with the predictions of extant work arguing that risk taking is most pronounced next to convex kinks or discontinuities in a manager's payoff [see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Murphy (1999) ]. In fact, in one of our specifications, risk-taking incentives are minimized around a discontinuity. These sharp differences in implications are due to the differences in adopted measures of risk taking. The traditional definition of a risk-taking incentive (e.g., standard in corporate finance) is the sensitivity of the manager's payoff to volatility. This measure captures the strength of the manager's desire to increase her risk exposure relative to some fixed status quo asset allocation. Our measure of risk taking is the optimal risk exposure as defined in the portfolio choice literature: the fraction of the fund optimally invested in the risky asset. Put differently, instead of just taking a partial derivative of the manager's value function with respect to volatility, we take this derivative and equate it to zero to derive the optimal volatility for each level of relative performance.
For most of our analysis we adopt the simplest possible setting, the Black and Scholes (1973) economy with a single source of risk. To investigate the manager's portfolio allocation across different stocks and exposure to systematic versus idiosyncratic risk, we extend our baseline model to multiple sources of uncertainty. The overall behavior of the manager is akin to that in the baseline model. However, the manager's incentive to deviate from the benchmark portfolio when underperforming now manifests itself not in increasing or decreasing the fund's volatility but in tilting the weight in each risky security away from the benchmark. We also show that risk shifting does not necessarily involve taking on idiosyncratic risk. In fact, when faced with both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, the manager may very well optimally expose herself to no idiosyncratic risk, while engaging in her optimal risk shifting via systematic risk only.
The costs of misaligned incentives resulting from the manager's policy are shown to be potentially economically significant. 3 We compare the manager's policy with that maximizing investors' utility alone. For example, we find that if the investor's relative risk aversion is 2 and the manager's is 1, the cost to the investor is nearly 10% of his initial wealth. The costs are particularly severe when the manager's and investor's attitudes towards risk differ substantially, when the flow-performance relationship increases steeply, or when the benchmark is very risky.
Finally, we collect daily returns of U.S. mutual funds to examine empirically the testable implications of our model. Since we are not the first to study risk taking of U.S. fund managers, we focus on testing the implications that are novel to our model. 4 Our first hypothesis is that underperforming managers boost the deviation of their portfolio from the benchmark, that is, increase the tracking error variance. We find support for this hypothesis, and no evidence that underperforming managers increase the volatility of their portfolios. The latter result is consistent with Busse (2001) . The second hypothesis is that managers who are sufficiently risk averse decrease their portfolio beta when underperforming the market. We find that managers who chose lower risk portfolios in a previous year, decrease their portfolio betas in the subsequent year when underperforming. We also find that funds whose current year's betas are below 1 decrease their portfolio beta when underperforming the market. However, while the signs of these responses are consistent with our theory, their magnitudes are considerably smaller, most likely reflecting the riskmanagement constraints imposed in practice [see Almazan et al. (2004) ]. Finally, we investigate how the extent to which funds have fallen behind the benchmark influences their risk-taking choices. We find that funds increase risk when moderately behind the benchmark, and cease to do so when they have fallen far behind.
Our work is related to the literature on money managers' incentives. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) study flows-induced risk taking by mutual fund managers. Unlike us, they define risk-taking incentive as the sensitivity of a fund's value to its volatility. Our analysis in a dynamic setting revisits Chevalier and Ellison and offers considerably different implications for managerial risk taking.
5 Within a dynamic asset allocation framework like ours, Carpenter (2000) examines the risk-taking behavior of a fund manager with a convex, option-based compensation. Such a payoff structure is not a subclass of the flow functions we consider since our manager always incurs a penalty (fund outflows) when her performance 4 Empirical work on risk taking by U.S. fund managers includes Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Busse (2001) , and more recently, Reed and Wu (2005) . Reed and Wu present a broad set of tests consistent with the main predictions of this paper, and argue that risk-shifting behavior of mutual fund managers is due to the benchmark-and not tournaments-induced incentives.
5 A related area in corporate finance is the work on risk averse managers' risk-taking incentives induced by executive stock options [Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) , Hall and Murphy (2000) , Hall and Murphy (2002) , Lewellen (2006) ]. Here, a risk-taking incentive is given by the sensitivity of the manager's certainty equivalent wealth to volatility. There are some similarities between the results obtained in this context and ours [see, especially Lewellen (2006) ]; however, unlike in our model the manager is assumed to hold a prespecified portfolio, and may affect risk exposure only through manipulating the company's stock price. The notion of implicit incentives was introduced by Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1999) , and applied to other related problems in corporate finance by, for example, Zwiebel (1995) and Huddart (1999) .
deteriorates, while a poor-performing manager in Carpenter enjoys a fixed ''safety net'' independent of her fund value. This safety net suppresses the poor-performing manager's risk aversion considerations, leading Carpenter to conclude that the fund volatility becomes unbounded. This contrasts with our findings that, in the underperformance region, the fund volatility (i) exhibits an interior extremum, and (ii) may decrease.
Building on the analysis of Carpenter and our paper, Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) analyze a hedge fund manager, incorporating further realistic features in the compensation structure along the lines of Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) . They also provide a thorough comparison of managerial risk taking arising in Carpenter et al. and our analysis. Brennan (1993) , Cuoco and Kaniel (2003) , and Gomez and Zapatero (2003) study equilibrium asset prices in an economy with agents compensated on the basis of their performance relative to a benchmark, and Arora and Ou-Yang (2006) study a fund manager's career concerns problem. Hugonnier and Kaniel (2004) endogenize (marketable) fund flows in a dynamic economy with a small investor and a noncompetitive fund manager. Under the derived flow function, however, the manager's optimal policy does not depend on her risk aversion, and does not involve any risk shifting. Berk and Green (2004) develop a model with a competitive capital market and decreasing returns to scale in active portfolio management. In the context of fund-value-maximizing managers, they deduce an empirically plausible fund flows-performance relationship even with no persistence in performance, but do not study risk-shifting behavior. Lynch and Musto (2003) suggest that the convexity in the flows-performance relationship is due to an abandonment option (replacement of personnel or technique after bad performance). Ross (2004) investigates the relation between the manager's fee structure and her attitude toward risk within a general class of preferences and compensation structures. However, he focuses on fee schedules under which the objective function remains globally concave. Chen and Pennacchi (2005) , like us, argue that relative-performance-based compensation may sometimes give the manager an incentive to decrease portfolio volatility; however, in their model the objective function is globally concave, which rules out the type of risk-shifting behavior studied in this paper. Becker et al. (1999) also model a manager concerned with her relative performance, but their primary focus is on testing for market timing in mutual funds. More in the spirit of our analysis, in a dynamic portfolio choice framework, Cadenillas, Cvitanić, and Zapatero (2004) consider a principal-agent problem in which a risk-averse manager compensated with options chooses the riskiness of the projects she invests in. There is also recent literature examining asset allocation under benchmarking constraints. In a dynamic setting like ours, Teplá (2001) , and Basak, Shapiro, and Teplá (2006) study the optimal policies of an agent subject to a benchmarking restriction.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the model, solves for the optimal risk exposure of the manager under various fundflow to relative-performance specifications, and computes the potential costs of active management to the investor due to managerial incentives. Section 2 discusses the extension of our analysis to multiple sources of uncertainty and multiple stocks. Section 3 provides some empirical support for our theory. Section 4 concludes. Proofs and further details are in the Appendix.
Fund Manager's Implicit Incentives

The economic setting
We adopt the familiar Black and Scholes (1973) We consider a fund manager who dynamically allocates the fund's assets, initially valued at W 0 , between the risky stock and the money market. Her portfolio value process, W , follows
where θ denotes the fraction of the portfolio invested in the risky stock, or the risk exposure. 6 Consistent with the leading practice, the manager's compensation, due at the horizon T , is proportional to the terminal value of assets under management. Such compensation provides the manager with implicit incentives arising from the well-documented fund-flows to relative-performance relationship [see e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997)] . If the manager does well relative to some benchmark (e.g., the stock market), her assets under management multiply owing to the inflow of new investors' money; if she does poorly, a part of assets under her management gets withdrawn. The benchmark Y relative to which her performance is evaluated is a value-weighted portfolio with a fraction β invested in the stock market and (1 − β) in the money market, satisfying 7
We denote the continuously compounded returns on the manager's portfolio and on the benchmark over the period [0, t] , respectively, and normalize Y 0 = W 0 , without loss of generality. At the terminal date, the fund receives flows at a rate f T , specified as follows:
Our model of this flow-performance relationship draws on the estimation by Chevalier and Ellison ( Figure 1 ). It is flat for managers who are well below the market. When the relative performance reaches about η L = −8%, the flow function displays a convex ''kink'' followed by an upward-sloping approximately linear segment. At about η H = 8%, the relationship again becomes flat. 8 Hereafter, we refer to this flow specification as a collar-type, as it resembles a collar or a bull spread of option pricing, with a lower threshold η L and an upper threshold η H . The flow rate f T is understood in the proportion-of-portfolio terms; for example if f T > 1, the manager gets an inflow, otherwise if f T < 1, she gets an outflow. The manager is guided by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, defined over the overall value of assets under management at time T :
where f T directly enters through the utility, and not through the budget constraint, because future (time-T ) fund flows are nontradable. We note that this payoff is consistent with a linear fee structure, predominantly adopted by mutual fund companies [e.g., Das and Sundaram (2001) , 7 Alternatively, the benchmark Y can be interpreted as a peer group performance. The optimal policies we derive in this paper would then constitute the best response of an individual manager. One may in principle attempt to go further and solve for a Nash equilibrium in the game amongst managers evaluated on their performance relative to the peer group. This, however, would require a manager to have full knowledge of other managers' preferences, portfolio compositions, etc. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) ]. 9 It turns out that this simple way of modeling fund flows is able to capture most of the insights pertaining to risk-taking incentives of a risk-averse manager that we attempt to highlight. In Section 1.3, we discuss how our results extend to other fund-flows to relative-performance relationships, and also reinterpret the resulting payoff function of the manager as a compensation contract. Absent implicit incentive considerations (f T = 1), the manager's optimal risk exposure, θ N , henceforth the normal risk exposure, is given by [Merton (1971)] :
By analogy, we define the risk exposure of the benchmark portfolio, θ Y , as the fraction of the benchmark invested in the risky asset:
Manager's risk-taking incentives
The optimization problem of the manager is given by:
subject to the budget constraint (1) and f T given by (2). This problem is nonstandard in that it is nonconcave over a range of W T , where the range is dependent on the performance of the stochastic benchmark Y . The empirical literature on the fund-flows to relative-performance relationship clearly indicates that convexities are inherent in the mutual fund managers' problems. A convexity in the manager's objective gives rise to a range of terminal portfolio values W T over which the manager is risk loving (and the objective lies below its concavified version). In our model, such a range, which we refer to as the risk-shifting range, is finite. In contrast to standard concave maximization problems, the shape of the manager's objective function in this range plays no role in the risk-taking choices of the manager. For the collar-type fund flow specification, the occurrence of the risk-shifting range is due to a convex kink at the lower threshold η L . The shape of the upward-sloping part of the flow function turns out not to matter for the manager's behavior under the following condition (see Appendix B): 
10 Our proof of Proposition 1 exploits the dependence of the benchmark Y on the economic state variable ξ . There is an alternative to this direct method, which is presented in the proof of Proposition 2 dealing with multiple sources of uncertainty and multiple stocks.
1591
(b) for economies with θ N < θ Y ,
andŴ t is as given in the proof. The knife-edge economies with θ N = θ Y are described in the proof.
Proposition 1 reveals that the manager's optimal behavior has a different pattern depending on whether the risk exposure of the benchmark is lower than the manager's normal risk exposure (economies (a)) or not (economies (b)). We note that both types of economies, (a) and (b), are empirically plausible since each economy is identified by conditions involving the manager-specific risk aversion γ , which need not equal that of a representative agent. The implications for optimal risk taking are best highlighted by plotting the manager's state-dependent risk exposure as a function of her performance relative to the benchmark, as presented in Figure 1 .
Two considerations drive the manager's behavior: her risk aversion and the risk-shifting incentive induced by the kink in her payoff when her relative performance is at the lower threshold η L . As emphasized in the vast risk-shifting literature [originating from Jensen and Meckling (1976) ], to increase her portfolio value, the manager has an incentive to distort her normal policy by boosting her portfolio volatility. Indeed, the manager's risk-loving behavior over a range of terminal payoffs gives rise to a hump in her optimal risk exposure, as clearly pronounced
The manager's optimal risk exposure The solid plots are for the optimal risk exposure, and the dotted plots are for the manager's normal risk exposure. In economies (a) parameter values are
in both panels of Figure 1 . In panel (a), this hump reflects an optimal choice to increase her portfolio volatility over the risk-shifting range. In panel (b), in contrast, the volatility is reduced. The latter direction is somewhat unexpected: how can ''gambling'' to finish ahead of the benchmark be consistent with a decrease in portfolio volatility? Simply, in the context of relative performance evaluation, any strategy entailing a deviation from the benchmark is inherently risky. By taking on more systematic risk than that of the benchmark (boosting portfolio volatility), the manager gambles to improve her relative standing when the benchmark goes up. Similarly, by taking on less systematic risk than that of the benchmark (reducing volatility), the manager bets on improving her relative performance when the benchmark falls. The direction of the manager's deviation from the benchmark depends on her risk aversion: a more risk-tolerant manager, whose normal policy is riskier than the benchmark, decides to boost volatility, while, in utility terms, it is cheaper for a relatively risk-averse manager to do the opposite, despite the positive risk premium offered by the risky asset. We note that this implication is very general, and holds for all alternative flow-performance specifications considered in Section 1.3. This suggests that volatility is not the most appropriate measure of risk under relative performance evaluation. As follows directly from our closed-form expressions, the quantity measuring risk taking in our model is the distance between the volatility of the manager's portfolio and that of the benchmark |σ
In both panels of Figure 1 Furthermore, when the manager is far behind or ahead of her benchmark, her flows-induced implicit incentives are weak, and so her optimal policy converges to her normal policy. Consequently, the optimal risk-shifting range is finite, positioned in the neighborhood of the convex kink in the flow-performance relationship. Over that range, the optimal risk exposure is not infinite, reflecting a trade-off between the managerial risk shifting and risk aversion. The maximum risk taking obtains somewhere inside this range; in Figure 1 , the maximum corresponds to a point deep in the underperformance region, well below the lower threshold η L . The minimum is around the upper threshold η H , where the manager ''locks in'' her gains by mimicking the benchmark. Here, it is useful to contrast our results on the manager's optimal risk taking to measures of risk-taking incentives as defined in the corporate finance literature, typically under the assumption of agents' risk neutrality. For example, Green and Talmor (1986) , in the context of the asset substitution problem, define the risk-taking incentive as the sensitivity of the value of the equityholders' option-like payoff to ''changes in investment risk'' (variability of the underlying cash flow). In option pricing, this measure is referred to as vega, the partial derivative of an option's (portfolio) value with respect to the underlying volatility. The risk-taking incentive then captures the strength of the (value-maximizing) manager's desire to increase her portfolio volatility relative to some state-independent status quo asset allocation, and is strongest when the manager's payoff vega achieves its maximum. Adopting this measure for the relativeperformance-based payoff, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) argue that the ''incentive to increase or decrease risk will always be maximized at the point at which the flow-performance relationship has a kink and will decline smoothly to zero at extreme performance levels.'' As evident from our Figure 1 , our measure of risk taking, the optimal risk exposure, conflicts with this prediction-in fact, in panel (b) the risk exposure is around zero at the convex kink η L . Intuitively, instead of merely taking a partial derivative of the manager's value function with respect to volatility, we take this partial derivative and equate it to zero to derive the optimal volatility for each level of relative performance.
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The wave-shape optimal policy, depicted in Figure 1 , finances the manager's terminal portfolio value. From Proposition 1, this terminal value displays three distinct patterns depending on the state of the world, given by the state price density, ξ T , with low ξ T representing good states and high ξ T bad states. In the extreme states (low ξ T or high ξ T ), the manager behaves as if the fund flows were constant at the low f L or high f H rate. In addition, there is an extended intermediate region in which the manager mimics the benchmark when her performance reaches the upper threshold η H . The nonconcavity of the manager's problem gives rise to a discontinuity in the optimal wealth profile at a critical level of the state ξ T =ξ , triggering the risk-shifting range.
The manager's optimal trading strategy throughout the year reflects the anticipation of the year-end drive to avoid the suboptimal range of the terminal portfolio returns. As is evident from Figure 2 , she does not wait until the year end to see how her returns turn out, to then take a gamble right before the terminal date if necessary. Rather, she starts tilting her risk exposure around the suboptimal range well in advance, giving rise to a hump in the risk exposure as in Figure 1 . However, the more opportunities she has to adjust her portfolio in the future, the less risk exposure she is willing to bear today. Risk-aversion (normal policy) considerations dominate early in the year, tempering the risk-shifting considerations and bringing the optimal policy closer to normal, but over time the risk-shifting motive grows stronger, and hence the magnitude of risk taking around the suboptimal range of portfolio returns increases. Additionally, the range over which the risk exposure displays a risk-shifting-induced hump shrinks monotonically as the horizon approaches, with the point at which the manager's policy is closest to mimicking the benchmark converging to η H .
Alternative flow-performance specifications and applications
This section considers generalizations of our baseline analysis to alternative specifications of the fund-flow to relative-performance relationship and also attempts to reinterpret the ensuing manager's payoff functions as compensation contracts.
Collar type (continued).
We first keep the collar-type fund-flow specification (2) but assume that Condition 1 is violated. In this case, the shape of the upward-sloping region of the fund flow function affects the manager's optimal policy. An analytical solution is not available for this case because the manager's optimal terminal portfolio value displays four regions of distinct behavior, and so we solve for the optimal policy numerically (see Appendix B for an elaboration on the form of the solution and Appendix C for the details of our numerical procedure). Figure 3 presents the solution.
We again see that the optimal risk exposure displays two different patterns, depending on whether the economy is of type (a) or (b). In the latter case, the manager optimally decreases the volatility of her portfolio. Overall, despite the more complex nature of the solution, the manager's optimal behavior is quite similar to that in Section 1.2. Although
The manager's optimal risk exposure when Condition 1 is not satisfied The solid plots are for the optimal risk exposure, and the dotted plots are for the manager's normal risk exposure. In panel (a), η H = 0.10, and in both panels μ = 0.08. The remaining parameter values are as in Figure 1 .
theoretically the minimum of risk exposure is achieved away from η H , it is not so visible in Figure 3 . It is useful to draw a parallel between the collar-type flow function and executive compensation contracts in the United States. The most prevalent form of annual bonuses offered to executives is the so-called 80/120 plan [Murphy (1999) ]. Under an 80/120 plan, the manager receives only a base salary if her performance does not exceed 80% of a prespecified performance standard. The point 20% below the performance standard is known as the ''performance threshold,'' at which the manager's compensation jumps up, and then increases continuously over an ''incentive zone''. The compensation schedule in the incentive zone is typically, although not always, linear. Annual bonuses are capped once the performance exceeds 120% of the performance standard. Under the plausible assumption of the base salary and hence the bonus (typically a percentage of base) being proportional to the company's size, 14 adopting a performance standard based on performance relative to a benchmark, we can attempt to reinterpret our manager's payoff function as an executive's base salary plus an annual bonus. Our collar-type specification is indeed very similar to an 80/120 plan; the only feature that is missing is the discontinuity at the performance threshold, which has been argued to affect a manager's incentives in a significant way. Since the literature on compensation typically looks at sensitivity-based measures of risk-taking incentives, our measure would potentially yield rather different conclusions pertaining to risk taking. Moreover, Proposition 1 shows that, for the case when Condition 1 holds, the shape of the incentive zone-concave, convex, or any other-is irrelevant to the manager's optimal choice, potentially defeating the intended purpose of the incentive zone.
Digital.
As discussed above, a manager's payoff is typically discontinuous at a performance threshold. We isolate the effects of such a jump by specializing the fund flow function f T as follows:
14 This assumption rules out the case where the manager's utility does not depend on how badly she is doing when underperforming. That case is considered by Carpenter (2000) , who considers a manager paid with a call option on firm assets. To obtain Carpenter's ''safety net'' at poor fund performance within our model, we may consider a fund flow function, which equals K/W T until a threshold level, and then becomes a constant. This provides the manager with a floor K for terminal portfolio values below K, and a payoff linear in W T for levels above K. Note that an interpretation of such a payoff as a flow-performance relationship is counterfactual because it rewards the manager for underperformance. Moreover, the fund inflows tend to infinity at zero fund value. This in turn induces an underperforming manager protected by a safety net to optimally choose an unbounded risk exposure even if she is risk averse. In contrast, our specification increasingly penalizes the manager for destroying firm value (e.g., reflecting an increase in the likelihood of being fired) and leads to a finite risk exposure when performing extremely badly.
If the manager's year-end relative performance is above the threshold η, she gets a high bonus f H , otherwise a low bonus f L . For this payoff, we again obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal risk exposure, which is given by the same expression as in Proposition 1 and the plot in Figure 1 , but with η H now replaced by the performance threshold η. Some comments are in order. As in Figures 1-2 , the risk-taking incentives induced by a jump in the bonus are minimized around the performance threshold η. This is somewhat surprising in light of the literature arguing that a discontinuity induces a peak in risk taking since the slope at the performance threshold is infinite [see e.g., Murphy (1999) ]. This contrast is again due to the differences in sensitivity versus optimality-based measures such as ours. The manager, being risk averse, strives to take on as little risk as necessary to exceed the performance threshold. A small risk increase suffices to achieve this when the performance is right below the threshold, where the payoff's sensitivity to volatility is extremely high. As the manager falls further behind, she needs a bigger gamble to catch up with the benchmark, and so her risk taking keeps increasing in the underperformance region until it reaches a maximum where the risk-shifting incentives are mitigated by her risk aversion.
1.3.3
Linear-convex and other specifications. Sirri and Tufano (1998) document that the flows become increasingly sensitive to performance in the region of good performance. We model this as follows:
with f L , ψ > 0 and η ∈ R. 15 Under this linear-convex specification, the flows are not sensitive to bad performance; however, they are very sensitive to good performance, increasing exponentially above the threshold η. Figure 4 reports the numerical solution for the manager's optimal behavior.
We again note the familiar pattern: a hump over the risk-shifting range and two types of deviations from the benchmark, distinguishing panels (a) and (b). The main difference here occurs in the overperformance region, where the flows are always convex. When far ahead of the benchmark, the manager's policy no longer tends to her normal. First, a convex flow function combined with a concave objective alters her effective risk aversion, which now tends to 2γ − 1 since in the limit her payoff is quadratic in portfolio value W . Second, even in the overperfromance limit, the manager's payoff depends on the level of the benchmark, a feature absent in our previous specifications. Since the flows are insensitive to bad performance, however, the limit of the risk exposure in the underperformance region coincides with the manager's normal policy, as before.
We have also considered a linear-linear specification of the flow-performance relationship, where the second segment has a higher slope, hence resembling a call option. Such a specification is motivated by asymmetric fees becoming more prevalent in European mutual funds. The optimal risk exposure is similar to that in Figure 4 , the only difference being that the manager again behaves as if her risk aversion were γ in the limit of good performance. We omit the figure for brevity. Finally, we conjecture that for a general payoff structure W T f T , the bulk of our results holds locally for every region in which u(W T f T ) is nonconcave. If such a region includes W T = 0 or W T = ∞, then at the global maximum (or minimum), the manager's risk exposure can be infinite (a corner solution) or not well-defined. Otherwise, the manager's risk exposure is bounded from above and below for each t, and the wave-shape pattern of risk-taking incentives is along the lines of that described in the preceding analysis.
Our analysis may be applied to other problems where payoff structures are nonconcave and agents are (effectively) risk averse. Beyond executive bonuses, other possible applications include stock-option-based executive compensation and option-like compensation of hedge fund managers. Nonconcave payoffs also arise in banking owing to deposit insurance and in corporate finance due to shareholders having a nonconcave payoff. Since in most of these applications nonconcavities in the payoff do not arise over a stochastic range as in our problem with a stochastic benchmark, it is worth pointing out that a riskless benchmark is a special case of our analysis. The optimal risk exposure will resemble that in Figure 1(a) . An additional application that fits our digital payoff specification is an election, with the two possibilities representing the outcomes of being elected or not. Our optimal risk-shifting range would then represent the behavior of a risk averse candidate who is behind in the polls.
Costs of active management
In this section, we assess the economic significance of the manager's adverse behavior. Towards this, we consider an investment policy associated with the manager's acting in the best interest of fund investors, fully ignoring her own incentives. A hypothetical fund investor is assumed to have CRRA
, γ I > 0, over the horizon wealth W T . The investor is passive in that he delegates all his initial wealth, W 0 , to the manager to invest. The decision to delegate, exogenous here, captures in a reduced form the choice to abstain from active investing due to various imperfections associated with money management (participation and information costs, time required to implement a dynamic trading strategy, transactions costs, behavioral limitations), or simply because he believes that the manager has better information or ability. The manager's investment policy that maximizes the investor's utility is given by
Note that an additional conflict of interest arises due to the differences in attitudes towards risk of the manager and the investor. The manager has an explicit incentive to manage assets in line with her own appetite for risk.
We compute the utility loss to the investor of the manager's deviating from the policy θ I . 16 Following Cole and Obstfeld (1991) , we define a cost-benefit measure,λ, reflecting the investor's gain/loss quantified in units of his initial wealth:
where V I (·) denotes the investor's indirect utility under the policy absent incentives θ I , andV (·) his indirect utility under the optimal policy accounting for incentivesθ . To disentangle the implications of explicit and implicit incentives, we decompose the total cost-benefit measure into two components: λ N and λ Y . The former captures the effects of the manager's attitude towards risk driving her normal policy, and the latter the effects of implicit incentives. In particular, λ . The gain/loss due to explicit incentives is determined by the manager's risk aversion, γ . Absent implicit incentives, the further γ deviates from the investor's risk aversion, γ I , the larger the discrepancy between the optimal risk exposure of the manager, θ N , and that optimal for the investor, θ I , and consequently the higher the loss to the investor. As reported in Table 1 (a) and (b), the loss due to explicit incentives, λ N , is zero when the manager and the investor have the same attitude towards risk, γ = γ I (= 2). However, for γ = 0.5 such a loss can be quite significant: 28.86% in economies (a) and 8.13% in economies (b). 17 The gain/loss due to implicit incentives is driven by the parameters of the flow-performance relationship. The more the manager gambles when underperforming, the more she deviates from the investor's desired risk exposure. Table 1 reveals that the loss to the investor due to implicit incentives alone, λ Y , increases with (i) the reward for outperformance, f H − f L , (ii) typically the riskiness of the benchmark, θ Y , and (iii) the flow threshold differential, η H − η L . For the largest implicit reward considered in Table 1 , f H − f L = 1.1, the loss is 10.26% in economies (a) and 6.88% in economies (b). Additionally, the effects of implicit incentives are most pronounced for relatively risky benchmarks. For example, Table 1a reports the cost due to implicit incentives to be 11.79% for the riskiest benchmark we consider (θ Y = 1.5), and Table 1b a corresponding cost of 8.45%. The combined effect of the explicit and implicit incentives can be considerable. Table 1 reports the total lost to the investors,λ, ranges from 2.27% to 48.16%.
Multiple Sources of Risk and Multiple Stocks
Until now, we have assumed the Black and Scholes (1973) economy in which the fund manager decides how to allocate her portfolio between a risky and a riskless asset. This setting has served as the simplest possible one to highlight the most important insights pertaining to risk-taking incentives. In real life, however, managers must often allocate their portfolios between different stocks, rather than between stocks and bonds. Moreover, unlike in our baseline model, managers may wish to adjust their portfolio riskiness through taking on idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. Thus, it is of interest to examine a setup in which one can make a distinction between the effects of systematic and idiosyncratic risks on the manager's decisions. 17 The values reported in Table 1 are for the model parameters, calibrated to conform with the observed market dynamics and capturing the observed flow-performance relationship for mutual funds. The reported range of managerial risk aversion coefficient γ is smaller in Table 1a than in Table 1b because the condition for economies (a) to occur imposes an upper bound on γ , equaling 2.34 for our baseline calibration.
Table 1a
Costs and benefits of active management in economies (a). 
Cost-benefit measures
Effects of
λ Y , λ N λ(%)= 1, γ I = 2, f L = 0.8, f H = 1.5, f L + f H = 2.3, β = 1, η L = −0.08, η H = 0.08, η L + η H = 0, μ = 0.08, r = 0.02, σ = 0.16, W 0 = 1, T = 1.
Table 1b
Costs and benefits of active management in economies (b). 
Cost-benefit measures
Effects of
To analyze these issues, we extend our model to multiple sources of uncertainty and multiple stocks. Each stock price, S i , follows
where the stock mean returns μ ≡ (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) and the nondegenerate volatility matrix σ ≡ {σ ij , i, j = 1, . . . n} are constant, and w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) is an n-dimensional standard Brownian motion. The benchmark Y is now a value-weighted portfolio with fractions β ≡ (β 1 , . . . , β n ) invested in the stocks and 1-β 1 in the money market, where 1 ≡ (1, . . . , 1) . The manager's optimization problem, as before, is given by (4). Allowing for multiple sources of uncertainty increases the dimensionality of the problem, introducing certain technical difficulties, and our proof of Proposition 1 does not readily extend. The proof of Proposition 2 employs a method to reduce the multistate variable problem to a single one via a change of variable (accounting for benchmarking) and a change of measure (accounting for risk aversion). As in Proposition 1, we present Proposition 2 in terms of the state-price density process ξ , following dξ t = −ξ t rdt − ξ t κ dw t , where now the market price of risk
For brevity, we present only the case where Condition 1 is satisfied. The solution has a similar structure to the single stock case, with our earlier insights going through component by component. This can be viewed as ''tilting'' positions in individual stocks. Thus, at the threshold η H , the manager selects portfolio weights in individual stocks close to those of the benchmark portfolio. When outperforming, the manager tilts each portfolio weight away from the benchmark and in the direction of her normal policy, converging to it in the limit. When underperforming, she deviates from the benchmark by tilting the investment in each stock i in the direction dictated by the sign of θ
Proposition 2. Under Condition 1, the optimal fractions of the manager's portfolio invested in risky assets and her terminal wealth are given bŷ
; that is, whether the manager's normal policy assigns a larger or smaller weight to the stock than its weight in the benchmark. For each stock's portfolio weight, we now obtain two typical investment patterns, where the underperforming manager either increases or decreases her weight in the stock, analogous to economies (a) and (b) of Proposition 1. Figure 5 illustrates this for the case of two risky stocks with parameters chosen such that θ (panel (b) ). The remaining cases are mirror images of the ones presented. Note that even with constant security price parameters (r, μ, σ) , the manager's investment policy does not display two-fund separation. We may rewrite the optimal risk exposure expression in Proposition 2 asθ t = (σ T ) −1 κ(1 + x t )/γ − βx t , where x t denotes the expression in {·} of Equation (5). Hence, we see that the optimal portfolio satisfies a three-fund separation property, with the three funds being the instantaneous mean-variance efficient portfolio of risky assets (σ T ) −1 κ/(1 T (σ T ) −1 κ), the benchmark portfolio θ Y , and the riskless asset.
We also examine whether the manager achieves her optimal risk-taking profile by taking on systematic versus idiosyncratic risk, given the current discussion in the literature [e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ]. When underperforming, does the manager really take on systematic risk as suggested by our baseline model, or rather, opt for idiosyncratic gambles, more in line with the perceived wisdom? To shed some light on this issue, we present a special case of our model, in which the manager has a choice between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. We consider a two-stock economy with the following parameterization:
Here, the relative performance benchmark Y is given by stock 1, which is driven solely by the Brownian motion w 1 . In contrast, stock 2 is purely driven by w 2 and does not command any risk premium, with mean return equal to the riskless rate. Consequently, the market price of risk is given
, 0 . In other words, by investing in stock 1 the manager is exposed to systematic risk, and by investing in stock 2 the manager takes on idiosyncratic risk. We report the ensuing optimal portfolio weights in stocks 1 and 2 in Figure 6 .
As evident from Figure 6 , the manager chooses to invest nothing in stock 2, and hence is not exposed to any idiosyncratic risk. Instead, she is only exposed to systematic risk and engages in risk-shifting via adjusting her position in stock 1, in a manner consistent with Section 1. The above example is not pathological. We have considered a sequence of economies parameterized by μ market price of risk due to w 2 is nonzero, and the weights in each risky asset are similar to those in Figure 6 . As we increase m, the investment in the second stock uniformly converges to zero.
Empirical Analysis
of portfolio riskiness adopted in these studies is the portfolio's total variance, and not the tracking error variance. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also find that underperforming managers increase risk towards the year end. Their paper provides stronger support for our theory because they measure risk as the sample variance of a fund's excess return over the market. However, as they use monthly data, their estimates of year-todate standard deviations could be quite imprecise. Using daily data, Reed and Wu (2005) argue that it is not underperformance relative to the peers but underperformance relative to the S&P 500 index that induces fund managers to gamble. Mutual fund managers appear to take larger risks before beating the S&P 500; after beating they tend to increase the correlation of their funds' assets with the market. None of these papers examines the risk-taking behavior of managers who normally desire lower risk exposure than their benchmark (our economies (b)), and thus gamble by decreasing the risk of their portfolios. We here provide a set of simple empirical tests that focus on the implications novel to our analysis, and thus complement the existing body of work. We combine daily returns data on U.S. mutual funds from the International Center for Finance at Yale SOM with the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual-fund database. Using CRSP objective codes, we leave only actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds in the aggressive growth, growth and income, and long-term growth categories. The data ranges from 1970 to 1998. This data range is comparable to those used by Chevalier and Ellison (date) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) , who document convexities in the flow-performance relationship, required for our risk-taking implications.
Our first hypothesis is that the tracking error variance is higher for managers whose year-to-date returns are below that of the benchmark than for those whose return are above the benchmark. To examine this hypothesis, for each year, we use funds' daily returns to estimate monthly sample standard deviations of each fund's excess return-a total of 12 entries per fund per year. For comparison, we also estimate monthly sample standard deviations of fund returns, as in Busse. On a monthly basis, for each fund, we compute an OVER indicator that equals 1 if the fund was overperforming the S&P 500 index, a benchmark also used by Chevalier and Ellison and others, as of the end of the preceding month. To reduce the noise in the data coming from the funds that are right at the benchmark-beating boundary, we require that a fund's year-to-date return was above the market for four out of last five trading days of the preceding month. Finally, we drop fund-year entries with fewer than 200 daily observations. We then regress the tracking error standard deviation, our risk measure, on the OVER indicator. The regression includes fundyear fixed effects. For comparison, we repeat this exercise for standard deviation of fund returns as the dependent variable. Table 2 reveals that the OVER indicator comes out significant in the tracking error regression. Consistent with our theory, managers tend to reduce their tracking error variance when overperforming the market, and gamble by increasing it when underperforming. In contrast, the effect on the variance of fund returns has the opposite sign; however, it ceases to be statistically significant throughout many of our robustness checks. This finding is in line with Busse, who argues that underperforming managers do not seem to manipulate their portfolio standard deviation towards the year end. We have performed a number of robustness checks and the message was the same. 18 Our second set of tests aims at providing evidence for economies of type (b), in which a manager gambles through reducing the systematic risk of her portfolio, rather than increasing it. Recall that, according to our model, a manager would choose this risk exposure pattern if she is sufficiently risk averse, that is, normally chooses a portfolio that is less risky than her benchmark. To identify such managers, we look at (i) their 18 We have repeated the exercise with an alternative, more contemporaneous, measure for the OVER indicator, OVER1, which equals one if the fund is overperforming the S&P 500 index for more than three quarters of the concurrent month, and zero otherwise. We have also tried the lagged version of it as a possible alternative. Throughout all these tests the effect of overperforming the S&P 500 index was always negative and significant at the 1% level. We have also repeated the exercise winsorizing our fund returns data to reduce the impact of outliers and data errors. Additionally, we have put a lagged dependent variable in the regression, as we were concerned about autocorrelation in the dependent variable, and the results were very similar to those in Table 2 . We have further repeated the regressions clustering by month and fund objective code, guarding against potential problems due to cross-sectional correlation. Significance of all of our possible OVER indicators has dropped, but has still remained at the 5% level. In the standard deviation regressions, however, all possible OVER indicators have become insignificant. Finally, we have rerun the analysis on a restricted dataset where we dropped fund-year entries for funds that were either above or below the S&P 500 for 90% of the year. The reason for this is that our identification strategy relies on the transition between the two regimes (above/ below the S&P500). Including funds that spent less than 10% of the year in one of the regimes could leave us with too few observations in that regime, making our estimates less precise. The results for this restricted dataset were qualitatively the same. portfolio betas in the preceding year, (ii) their betas in the current year, and construct a subsample of funds whose betas are below one. Then, for each fund for each week, we construct an UNDER indicator that equals one when the fund's year-to-date return is below that of the S&P 500 as of the end of the preceding week. To reduce noise coming from the funds on the benchmark-beating boundary, we require that additionally the fund was above the S&P 500 for four out of five days of the preceding week. Our hypothesis is that sufficiently risk-averse managers decrease their portfolio betas when underperforming the market. Of course, there are many other influences potentially affecting funds' betas. We therefore also include fund-year fixed effects, as well as month fixed effects. The latter are to control for seasonality in betas, documented by, for example, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) . Because of the computational restriction to keep the size of the dummy-variable set manageable, we do not include any fixed effects for the intercept terms, but those are too small and insignificant to make any appreciable difference. We again drop fund-years with fewer than 200 entries. We then regress daily funds' excess returns on the excess return on the S&P 500 interacted with the UNDER indicator, as well as the excess return on the S&P 500 interacted with the month and fund-year dummies, and report the results in Table 3 . In both tests, the underperformance indicator interacted with the market is negative and significant. Underperforming managers who fall into our type-(b) category, that is, whose betas are below 1, choose to reduce their portfolio betas. The effect is similar in magnitude and significance for the two approaches to isolating managers who normally desire lower risk exposure than the market, based on their betas this year or last year. We have performed a number of robustness checks and the message was the same. 19 However, while the signs of our estimates are consistent with our theory, their magnitudes are considerably smaller, most likely reflecting the risk-management constraints imposed in practice [see Almazan et al. (2004) ].
Finally, we test whether the ''gambling'' behavior of a fund manager is less pronounced if she has fallen far behind the benchmark. 20 Towards that end, we expand the menu of our underperformance indicators, now distinguishing between the funds that are currently trailing the benchmark by more than 5, 10, 15, or 20%. We again look only at economies of type (b), identifying sufficiently riskaverse managers by the same procedure as in our previous test. In the interest of space, we only report the results for funds whose previous year's beta was below 1 and always include month fixed effects; the results for funds whose current year's beta is below 1 and results without month fixed effects are very similar. The criteria for including observations in our analysis are as before. Table 4 reports the findings.
We have seen from our earlier results that sufficiently risk-averse fund managers who fall behind the benchmark decrease their betas. Table 4 reveals that if they fall further behind, by 5%, they tend to decrease their betas even further. When the funds' underperformance reaches the 10-15% range, the ''gambling'' incentives of the managers subside. The statistical significance of the estimates in rows three and four is weak, and it weakens further in several robustness checks. So, the maximum deviation from the managers' normal policies appears to be occurring at a level of underperformance somewhere between −15% and −5%. This is consistent with our theoretical finding that at some level of underperformance, the incentives to gamble are counterbalanced by a manager's risk aversion, and the deviation from the normal policy reaches its maximum. Below the maximum deviation point, at −20%, the reward to ''gambling'' is small relative to the utility costs due risk aversion, and the managers raise the betas of their funds. This pattern is consistent with the predictions of the theory: throughout all specifications of the flow-performance relationship considered in Section 1, the optimal risk exposure of the manager is always humpshaped. 21
Conclusion
We have attempted to isolate one of the most important adverse incentives of a fund manager: an implicit incentive to perform well relative to a benchmark. This incentive introduces a nonconcavity in the manager's problem, akin to nonconcavities observed in many corporate finance applications (e.g., asset substitution problem, ''gambling for resurrection,'' executive compensation, hedge fund managers' compensation). It has been argued that in some of these applications, agents do not behave as though they are risk neutral, but effectively as risk averse. Our methodology of dealing with nonconcavities in the presence of risk aversion may then help shed some light on these and other issues of interest. We solve the manager's problem within a standard complete-markets framework, which offers considerable tractability, allowing us to derive the manager's optimal policy in closed-form. In many real world applications, nonconcavities in the payoff structure go hand in hand with capital markets frictions-for example, with restrictions against trading the underlying security designed to induce the ''right'' incentives to the manager. Our story of the optimal interaction of risk-shifting with risk aversion would then be further confounded by the effects of such frictions. In our setup, the need to constrain the manager's investment choice arises naturally as the potential costs of misaligned incentives resulting from the manager's policy turn out to be economically significant. In related work, Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2006) demonstrate how a simple risk-management practice that accounts for benchmarking can ameliorate the adverse effects of managerial incentives. We believe that endogenizing investment restrictions in the context of active money management is a fruitful area for future research. It would also be of interest to endogenize within our model the fund-flows to relativeperformance relationship that we have taken as given. Finally, while we focus on the fund manager's changing her portfolio composition in response to incentives, this may not be the only way the manager can increase her relative performance. As Christoffersen (2001) documents, about half of money fund managers voluntarily waive fees so as to increase their net return, and variation in these fee waivers is largely driven by relative performance. It would be interesting to incorporate such a feature into our model.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Before proceeding with the proof, we present for completeness the results that were not included in the body of the proposition. First, note that for γ = 1,
1−1/κ . Second, sinceŴ t ξ t is a martingale (given the dynamics ofŴ t and ξ t ), the time-t wealth is obtained by evaluating the conditional expectation ofŴ T ξ T . In the economies described in (a):
Similarly, in the economies described in (b): We now proceed with the steps of the proof. To obtain the risk exposure expressions in the proposition, note that from (1), the diffusion term of the manager's optimal portfolio value process isθ t σŴ t . Equating the latter term with the diffusion term obtained by applying Itô's Lemma to (A1) and (A2) yields the expressions forθ t in economies (a) and (b), respectively. Therefore, to complete the proof, it is sufficient to establish optimality of the given terminal wealthŴ T . Methodologically, most related to this proof is the proof of Proposition 2 of the constrained model in Basak, Shapiro, and Teplá (2006) , but the setting here is notably different and the optimization problem is unconstrained. The non-concavity of the problem, arising due to (4), has an extra dimension of complexity, as not only does the expression we employ for the convex conjugate have a discontinuous non-concavity at a stochastic location, but the magnitude of the discontinuity is stochastic as well. Therefore, to our knowledge, the way the proof below adapts the martingale representation and the convex-duality techniques [see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1988) ] to a non-concave problem, has not been previously used in the literature.
Appealing to the martingale representation approach, the dynamic budget constraint (1) of the manager's optimization problem can be restated using the terminal value of the state price density process as 
where the inequality is due toŴ T satisfying the budget constraint with equality, W T satisfying the budget constraint with inequality, and where
To show optimality ofŴ T , it is left to show that the right-hand side of (A3) is non-negative. Under the geometric Brownian motion dynamics of Y T and ξ T , and using the normalization of Y 0 and ξ 0 , it is straightforward to verify that
Given the manager's CRRA preferences, to establish the non-negativity of (A3) one needs to account for the relation between the parameters γ , β, σ , and κ in (A5). To avoid repetition of technical details, we provide the proof for optimality ofŴ T for the economies in (a) with γ > 1. The logic of the proof applies to the remaining subdivisions of the parameter space, as identified in the Proposition. Therefore, we now show that for the case in which
Indeed, in the above convex conjugate construction, there are three local maximizers of v (W, ξ ) : , ξ) + g(ξ ) . Then, using κ/(βσ ) > γ > 1, and the fact that g(ξ ) < 0, g(∞) = ∞, it is straightforward to verify that g(ξ ) > 0 if and only if ξ > ξ a , where g(ξ a ) = 0, and ξ a > ξ, thereby completing the proof for the case of interest in the parameter space. Note that since W L (ξ ) = W A (ξ ), havingŴ = W A forξ < ξ < ξ a gives rise to a discontinuity inŴ T as a function of ξ T at ξ a . The discontinuity arises in the other subcases in (a) as well, and analogously, under the parameter values in (b), the optimal policy is discontinuous at ξ b .
Proof of Proposition 2. To establish optimality of the stated terminal wealth for the manager's optimization problem in (4) under n sources of uncertainty and n risky assets, it is still sufficient to establish the non-negativity of the right-hand side of (A3), as in the proof of Proposition 1. However, because for n > 1, ξ and Y each span a different subspace of the state space, v(W, ξ ) as given in (A4) does not in general simplify to the parametric form in (A5). Therefore, to gain further tractability, note that in
Using this change of variables (V
The equality in (A6) is readily verified by following steps analogous to those in Proposition 1, to show that each of the three local maximizers in the above convex conjugate construction is indeed a global maximizer in designated ranges of π . The equality in (A7) holds owing to the change of variables. The expression in brackets in (A7) 
Appendix B: Nonconcavities and Risk Shifting
To further illustrate the role of nonconcavities, we consider a simple static setting with two periods (0, T ). As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, via a change of variable and a change of measure one can replace the manager's objective function by that defined over the relative portfolio value V T = W T /Y T , and replace the budget constraint by an equivalent representation in terms of V t . In particular, for the collar-type fund flow specification (2), the manager's objective function becomes:
The concavification of this function involves solving for the concavification points V and V and the chord between V and V . Formally, this requires solving the system of equations
for a, b, V , and V . The tangency point V may or may not belong to the range (e η L , e η H ). If it does, the concavification occurs within the range where u(V ) is given by u M (V ). Otherwise, the concavification occurs at the corner, at e η H . The condition distinguishing the latter case is V ≥ e η H , which is equivalent to Condition 1 (after some algebra). If Condition 1 holds, Equations (B1)-(B2) need to be modified accordingly to account for the corner solution. Figure 7 depicts the transformed utility function u(V T ) with its concavification superimposed on the plot by the dashed line. In both panels, one can see a finite range of relative portfolio values over which the utility is nonconcave, and hence the manager has an incentive to gamble. That is, she would always prefer adding a zero present value gamble {+ε with probability 50%, −ε with probability 50%} to her status quo portfolio (defined by some fixedθ ) over ending up with a value in the suboptimal range (V , V ). Indeed, the optimal terminal fund portfolio value derived in Proposition 1 features a discontinuity, responsible for the manager's risk-shifting behavior discussed in Section 1.2. Figure 7 also highlights the role of Condition 1. In panel (a), the intermediate segment of the objective function is subsumed within the suboptimal range, and hence its shape is immaterial for the manager's choice of her optimal terminal portfolio value and hence the risk exposure. In panel (b), part of the intermediate segment of the objective function u M (·) falls outside the suboptimal range, and hence the functional form defining this segment enters in the solution of the manager's optimal policy.
How would the manager, whose investment opportunity set consists of assets with continuous distributions, achieve a discontinuous optimal wealth profile? Simply, by taking advantage of continuous trading and thus synthetically replicating a 50/50 gamble, or its close substitute, a binary option. One can see from the expressions for the optimal trading strategies that they indeed contain binary option-type components. What if, perhaps more realistically, the manager is unable to synthetically create a binary option, as would be the case, for example, in the popular two-period model with continuous state space but with a finite number of securities available for investment? The above argument indicates that in such an economy the manager would clearly benefit from introduction of specific securities into her investment opportunity set: binary options. We note that this discussion applies generally to any preferences exhibiting a nonconcavity.
Appendix C: Numerical Procedure
For the cases in which an analytical solution is not available, we solve the model numerically. Our numerical solution utilizes a Monte Carlo simulation [e.g., Boyle, Broadie, and Glasserman (1997) ]. The simulation presented here is for the economic setting of Section 1, with Y t = S t . We first simulate the relative portfolio valueV t (π t ) using Equation (A8). This simulation requires knowledge of the distribution of π T under the G measure (proof of Proposition 2), which in our setup is where z is a standard normal random variable. The second step is to compute the trading strategy financingV t (π t 
The derivative
∂V t (π t ) ∂π t
is computed numerically from the simulatedV t (π t ) schedule. Briefly, the details of the procedure are as follows. 
